As we are in sight of the second Trump-Kim summit, with Trump boasting optimism toward North Korea's de-nuclearisation, it's probably a good idea to familiarise yourself with the complicated relationship between these two countries.
North Korea joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1974 and signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985, allegedly due to Soviet pressure. This did not last long however. Pyongyang abruptly dropped out of the NPT in 1993.
Worry grew over the implications of an unstable North East Asia, and so many turned to the only remaining superpower, the United States, to take a stand on international security.
All it took was a step forward from the president to exemplify the US’s position as the leader of international security, and when President Bill Clinton described North Korea, Cuba, Iran and Libya as “rogue states”, the international community had its champion.
In response to North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT in 1993, the Pentagon drew up plans to send F-117 stealth fighters to strike North Korea’s nuclear facilities.
Facing heavy economic sanctions and threats of US air strikes, Kim-il Sung backed down and the Clinton administration negotiated the 1994 Agreed Framework.
The US offered – at an estimated cost of over $4 billion – two proliferation-resistant light water reactors (LWRs) and an annual 500,000 tons of heavy oil. In response, the DPRK had to freeze all graphite-moderated nuclear reactors and remain in the NPT.
Despite pursuing an ABC (Anything But Clinton) policy, the Bush administration’s foreign policy toward North Korea was characterised by a mixture of sanctions and incentives.
In October 2002, the Agreed Framework collapsed due to funding and allegations toward both sides. As a result, Pyongyang reactivated its Yongbyon reactor and withdrew from the NPT. Becoming increasingly occupied by the Iraq war, Bush relied on China to be a broker in the North Korean situation.
In 2006, Pyongyang performed a nuclear test which led the UN Security Council to pass Resolution 1718, imposing a series of economic sanctions.
Obama subsequently criticised the Bush administrations lack of engagement with North Korea and supported “direct and aggressive diplomacy”.
However, soon after Obama became president, his administration dropped engagement in favour of “strategic patience”, essentially waiting for North Korea to come back to the negotiating table with a better attitude whilst increasing economic sanctions.
After a second nuclear detonation in May 2009 and the sinking of the South Korean vessel Cheonan in March 2010, Obama pursued international sanctions through the United Nations.
In 2013, North Korea’s third nuclear detonation triggered increased sanctions from the US and other members of the international community. The Obama administration was consistent with “strategic patience”, although it has been criticised for having little tangible outcomes.
President Trump’s stances have transitioned from Obama’s “strategic patience” to “strategic uncertainty”. Trump uses unpredictability as a virtue and refuses to broadcast US plans of actions, being willing to increase tensions and having sudden flexibility to strike a deal.
To be honest, the unpredictability of the US-North Korea relationship makes optimistic predictions of the Trump-Kim 2019 summit seem just as likely as pessimistic ones.
Trump sounds more realistic now. “Decent chance of denuclearisation,” he tweeted last month.
However, as previously mentioned, volatility on the side of the North Koreans proves that Kim will not give up his nukes that easily. And to be fair, the Kim regime has a decent hand in this game with the US. Additionally, it would be unwise to take Trump’s infamous claims of spectacular results seriously.
Trump is unlikely to remove economic sanctions anytime soon but may encourage a deal between the US and both Koreas. As we’ve seen, general volatility renders denuclearisation absurd, until it genuinely happens.