US President Donald Trump met with North Korean chairman Kim Jong-un for the second time in Hanoi, Vietnam on Wednesday 27th February. As suggested by Statecraft in its last article, the Summit ended abruptly with no agreement as North Korea demanded an end to economic sanctions in order to further its denuclearisation.
The 2019 Hanoi Summit was a follow up to a previous summit held in Singapore in July 2018. Whilst historically important, the summit resulted in a vague joint statement signed by the leaders of Washington and Pyongyang.
Vague agreements and joint statements are a familiar face in the relationship between North Korea and the US. From Clinton’s 1994 Agreed Framework to Bush’s September Agreement under the Six-Party talks, all have resulted in statements with goals of denuclearisation without success.
To that we should add a caveat, though. Clinton’s 1994 Agreed Framework offered positive sanctions (economic incentives) in exchange for North Korean denuclearisation. At an estimated $4 billion at the time, Congress refused to fund the bill and it eventually collapsed in 2001.
Economic incentives, as well as security assurances, are seen by many, but not all, as the best method to denuclearise North Korea. Again, as stated in previous Statecraft articles, Trump’s foreign policy can be easily delineated as strategically uncertain. Therefore, rationalism and logic are not as present in his foreign policy as previous presidents.
With Clinton’s relationship with North Korea is surely known to Trump, he should learn from Clinton’s mistakes. We need hard economic incentives or trade deals proposed to North Korea.
Understandably, moral questions can be raised over positive sanctions with North Korea, a state known for its numerous human rights atrocities.
To this, one must raise an eyebrow at Trump’s willingness to praise the Kim regime in what many analysts have called an unusual “bromance” but, at the same time refusing to budge in it’s side of the bargain. This is feature brought about by vague policies on US-North Korea’s numerous and current statements. There is no framework to measure denuclearisation. Nor is there a framework to decide what sanctions should be lifted or imposed in response to this.
According to Trump, the talks broke down because North Korea had demanded all sanctions be lifted in order to denuclearise, whereas, Ru Yong Ho claimed Kim had proposed a “partial removal” of United Nations sanctions that affect the “civilian economy and the livelihood of our people.”
Analysts have said that there was inherent lack of preparation before the Summit. Trump’s domestic issues such as the US-Mexico border wall and Michael Cohen’s testimony have surely influenced this.
On 1 January this year, Kim Jong-un made it very clear corresponding measures would lead to progress in the US-North Korea relationship. He was pointing at sanctions relief.
Yet, one thing is clear. Trump has commented that he will not increase sanctions against Pyongyang, and he would love to see them lifted in the future. The message, whilst familiar in it’s Trump-style vagueness, shows the days of “maximum pressure” are gone.
You may believe Pyongyang will continue its current denuclearisation steps on this promise. I for one, do not. Improved relations with China may certainly incentivise North Korea to stay put.
North Korea may not continue to denuclearise, but they are already an arguable threat to world peace with their current nuclear arsenal. Trump needs to budge sooner, rather than later.
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